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Why Remit? The Case of Nicaragua 
 
In the last two decades remittances have gained interest due to their large size. For several 
developing countries remittances constitute a large portion of their GDP and sometimes 
exceed FDI. While FDIs are usually profit driven, it is not clear what the driving force behind 
remittances is. This paper presents a simple theoretical model of migrants' remitting 
behavior. I consider two general motivations for remitting: altruism and self-interest. Using a 
heteroskedastic Tobit with a known form of variance I test the findings of the theoretical 
model with data from Nicaragua. Evidence suggests that migrants from Nicaragua remit for 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the last two decades remittances have been on the rise. Official estimates show that 
remittances averaged around 60 billion U.S. dollars per year in the 1990s (World Bank) 
and  reached  167  billion  U.S.  dollars  in  2005  (World  Bank’s  Global  Economic 
Prospects).  Several studies document that remittances already exceed foreign aid and 
foreign  direct  investment  (FDI)  for  some  developing  countries  Connell  and  Brown 
(2004), De Haas (2006), Heilmann (2006) and Chami et al. (2006). This fact raised 
questions on whether remittances can be seen as a possible source of growth Durand et 
al. (1996) and Widgren and Marin (2002).   
Remittances differ from other types of capital flows in three main aspects. First, 
remittances go directly into the hands of the households in the receiving countries rather 
than indirectly through private or governmental institutions. Second, capital flows such 
as FDIs are in general profit driven and therefore are positively related to GDP growth. 
However, this is not always the case for remittances. Remittances are not always profit 
driven and can be altruistically motivated. Finally, FDIs tend to be less stable relative to 
remittances Orozco (2002). 
Uncovering the reasons for remitting is crucial for policy implication for several 
reasons. From the original household perspective, the forces behind remittances can shed 
some  light  on  households’  migration  strategies  De  La  Brière  et  al.  (2002).  In  fact 
Hoddinott  (1994)  stresses  that  remittances  should  be  incorporated  in  the  model  of 
household migration decisions. Hoddinott also notes that remittances can be part of a   3
long  term  contract  between  the  head  of  the  original  household  and  the  migrating 
member.  
From a macroeconomic look, remittances are thought to be intended to ease the 
burden of poor economic performance on local recipients Chami et al. (2005). Therefore 
altruistically  motivated  remittances  are  expected  to  be  countercyclical  with  income 
growth  and  consequently  can  decrease  the  scope  of  the  government  intervention  in 
recession  times.  In  this  particular  case,  policies  built  on  predictions  that  remittances 
behave in the same manner as other types of capital flows might have unanticipated 
consequences.  
The literature on remittances has mostly focused on finding the determinants of 
remittances. In this paper I present a simple theoretical model of remittance behavior. I 
consider remittances as unidirectional flows from the migrant in a host country to the 
original household in the home country which I refer to in this paper as the receiving 
household. This allows me to consider the reaction of remittances to a bad state outcome 
on  the  receiving  household.  This  is  the  first  paper  that  looks  at  the  response  of 
remittances to shocks that pertain to the receiving household. This is crucial in terms of 
investigating the remittance behavior since most remittances consider the migrant as a 
source  and  the  receiving  household  as  the  end  destination  and  therefore,  they  are 
expected to react to any income shocks at the receiving end. This setup gives two broad 
motivations  for  remitting:  altruism  where  migrants  simply  care  about  the  receiving 
household  members’  welfare  and  self-interest  where  migrants  remit  for  investment 
opportunities that are expected to yield a certain payoff in the future. I test the theoretical   4
predictions of this model using survey data from Nicaragua. I quantify the results of the 
heteroskedastic Tobit for policy purposes.  
Altruism  seems  to  be  the  main  motivation  behind  the  remitting  behavior  to 
Nicaragua.  Moreover  the  remitting  behavior  is  not  identical  across  gender.  Female 
migrants seem to behave more altruistically toward the receiving household. 
This  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  a  brief  summary  of  the 
existing literature. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model of remittance behavior. 
Section 4 introduces the data and explains the estimation method. Section 5 includes the 
results and section 6 represents the conclusion. 
2. Literature Review 
 
Lucas  and  Stark  (1985)  discuss  several  hypotheses  for  motivations  to  remit.  Three 
reasons  for  remitting  are  presented  ranging  from  pure  altruism  to  pure  self-interest 
spanning a more tempered point of view combining these two extremes. Under pure 
altruism a migrant derives utility from the utility of those persons at home. A migrant 
therefore enjoys remitting because this will subsequently increase his utility. Under pure 
self-interest  the  migrant's  satisfaction  depends  on  self-interest  goals  that  range  from 
inheritance, investments, and the intention of one day returning home. A third possible 
motive  is  viewing  remittances  as  part  of  an  arrangement  between  the  migrant  and 
persons at home. This arrangement is seen as a mutually beneficial contract between the 
two parties.  
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) is one of the first papers that relate the remittance 
behavior  and  the  motivation  behind  remitting  in  a  theoretical  model.  Agarwal  and   5
Horowitz set up a two period model taking into consideration the possibility of multiple 
migrants per household. They solve for the first order conditions of a migrant’s expected 
utility function and define an implicit remittance function for two cases: pure altruism 
and the insurance motive. The key result lies in the significant effect of the number of 
other migrants on remittance under altruism. However the number of migrants does not 
affect average remittance under the risk-sharing case. Agarwal and Horowitz use data for 
Guyana to test their theoretical predictions. Their empirical findings show significant 
differences  in  the  remitting  process  of  migrants  from  multiple  and  single  migrants’ 
households. Their findings support altruism as a main motivation for remitting.  
Brown and Poirine (2005) make use of the theory of intergenerational transfers to 
sketch  a  two-period  informal,  intrafamilial  loan  arrangement  to  analyze  migrants’ 
remittances of Pacific Island migrants in Sydney, Australia. They develop an alternative 
theory based on parental behavior that lies between strong altruism and self-interest that 
they refer to as “weak altruism”. Their results imply that neither strong altruism nor pure 
self-interest  needs  to  be  used  to  explain  intergenerational  transfers  in  low-income 
countries.  They suggest linking the theory of  private intergenerational transfers, the 
theory  of  human  capital  investment  to  the  theory  of  migrants’  remittances  when 
investigating remittance behavior.   
In a more recent paper Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) stress upon the part of 
remittances transferred to buy two types of insurance: family-provided and self-provided 
insurance. The authors use data on Mexican immigrants to measure income risk and find   6
that  increases  in  the  latter  raise  both  the  likelihood  and  the  percentage  of  migrants’ 
earnings remitted for insurance purposes.  
All  the  papers  listed  above  focus  on  the  risk  sharing  aspect  of  remitting  by 
investigating the effects of a bad state outcome in the host country on the migrants’ 
remitting  behavior.  While  an  income  shock  in  the  host  country  is  important  in 
determining  the  remitting  ability  of  the  migrant,  remittances  are  consequences  of 
migration  and  they  are  expected  to  react  to  shocks  in  the  receiving  country.  In  the 
following section I present a theoretical model of migrant remitting behavior that allows 
for a bad state shock on the receiving household.  
3. Theoretical Model 
 
The goal of this paper is to derive a hypothesis on the migrant’s remitting behavior. In 
this section I present a variant of the model presented in Agarwal and Horowitz (2002).  
The  model  presented  in  Agarwal  and  Horowitz  (2002)  defines  the  bad  state 
shock to be migrant specific and therefore originates in the destination country of the 
migrant.  In  this  paper  I  include  a  bad  state  shock  on  the  receiving  household  and 
investigate  the  remitting  behavior  of  migrants  towards  that  shock.  The  main  reason 
behind the placement of the bad state shock is that migration and remittances are to a 
certain  extent  related  Hoddinott  (1994).  In  this  regard,  exploring  the  reaction  of 
remittances  to  an  income  shock  in  the  receiving  household  might  be  crucial  for 
determining  the  remitting  behavior.  Moreover,  in  the  theoretical  model  presented  in 
Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) migrants expect monetary transfers from the receiving 
household in case of a bad state outcome in the host country. The authors model the flow   7
of remittances as a two way stream. In this paper I model remittances as unidirectional 
monetary flows with the origin being the migrants and the final destination being the 
receiving households. 
In effect, the Nicaraguan dataset analyzed in this paper includes 505 families that 
have migrants living abroad of which only 16 families send monetary transfers to these 
migrants. Out of these 16 families, six families also receive remittances from migrants. 
This last number of families is around 1.1% of the number of the families that have 
migrants  living  abroad  in  the  Nicaraguan  2001  survey  sample.  Table  1  presents  the 
characteristics of households and migrants by the level of monetary engagement of the 
receiving households in the remitting process conditional on having one migrant living 
abroad. Comparing households that receive remittances in column (B) to households that 
send  remittances  in  column  (C),  the  main  difference  is  in  the  location  of  residence. 
Households that send remittances tend to reside in urban areas. In addition, differences 
include the gender composition and labor force status of the head of the household, the 
destination  of  the  migrant,  and  the  relationship  of  this  migrant  to  the  head  of  the 
receiving household. Male and working head of households tend to form the bulk of the 
receiving households that send remittances abroad. Moreover, it seems that a migrant’s 
move to a developed country requires households in Nicaragua to share the cost of the 
move. In fact, receiving households that send remittances represented in columns (C) 
and (D) show larger percentages of migrants living in developed countries relative to 
those households that receive remittances and those that do not send or receive. For   8
those households with dual remittances flows, column (D), the striking difference is the 
location of the residence and the destination of the migrant.  
To summarize, the receiving households that participate in sending remittances 
have on average notably higher percentages of working head of households, male head 
of households and younger head of households. Now focusing on only columns (A) and 
(B) I note that there might be a threshold level of households’ characteristics that define 
receiving households which do not send or receive versus those that do send monetary 
transfers to migrants living abroad. The percentages of working head of the household, 
residing in urban areas and male head of household are indeed higher under column (A) 
than those in column (B) but still lower than the percentages in column (C). Also the 
migrants  who  belong  to  households  in  column  (C)  tend  to  be  living  in  developed 
countries
2.  
Additionally  the  small  number  of  families  who  engage  in  two  direction 
remittances seem to be consistent across low income countries. Agarwal and Horowitz 
(2002) report a very similar finding for Guyana (1.4%). For the purpose of this paper I 
ignore remittances from receiving households because it seems that across developing 
countries  the  frequency  of  two-way  remittances  is  relatively  small.  In  the  following 
subsection I present the theoretical model.  
3.1. Pure Altruism 
                                                 
2 The subset of developed countries as a destination for Nicaraguan migrants includes Canada, Greece, 
Sweden and United States. The countries that did not make it in this sample are Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, 
China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama 
and Tunisia. Both samples cover the destination of all the migrants in the Nicaraguan 2001 survey sample.    9
Based on the previous section, I assume that migrants do not receive monetary 
transfers from their original household. This assumption leaves out the specific case of 
risk-sharing that the literature has extensively modeled Agarwal and Horowitz (2002) 
and Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) but it does follow the empirical evidence more 
closely. I build a two period model where a migrant who cares about the welfare of the 
receiving household has the following utility: 
                                       H i i i C C C U log log log 2 1 δ β α + + =             (1) 
where α is the weight on migrant  i’s consumption in period 1 given by  1 i C ,  β  is the 
weight on migrant i’s consumption in period 2 given by  2 i C  and δ is the weight on  H C , 
the recipient household consumption. The weights on consumption are positive such as 
α < 0   and  β < 0 and δ ≤ 0 .  The  receiving  household  consumption  depends  on  high 
income  H Y  with probability of  π  and low income  L Y  with probability of  π − 1 , with 
. 0 > − L H Y Y  The receiving household consumption also depends on the total remittances 
received by the householdR . The total remittances  R  can be written as  i i kr r − +  where 
i r  is migrant  i’s own remittances and,  k is the number of other migrants belonging to 
the same receiving household who remit on average i r− . The altruistic migrant chooses  i r  
to maximize utility subject to  
    i i i r Y C − = 1 1                                      (2) 
      2 2 i i Y C =                   (3) 
and   10
     ( ) i i L H H kr r Y Y C − + + − + = π π 1                             (4) 
where  1 i Y is the migrant’s income in the first period and  i r  is the migrant’s remittances. 
The second period migrant’s consumption  2 i C depends on the migrant’s second period 
income 2 i Y . The migrant chooses the level of remittances to maximize utility subject to 
(2), (3) and (4). The first order conditions (FOC) are: 















                     (5)                                     
Solving for  i r  from equation (5) I define a remittance function given by: 
          ( ) π ; ; ; ; 1
* k Y Y Y r r L H i i =                                                         (6) 
Equation (6) states that remittances sent by migrant  i depends on the migrant’s 
first  period  income,  the  receiving  household  income,  the  number  of  other  migrants 
belonging to the same receiving household, and the probability of a good state in the 
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Both derivations represented in equations (7) and (8) have a negative sign. This 
suggests that altruistic migrants’ remittances respond negatively to both the number of 
other migrants belonging to the same receiving household and the probability of a good 
                                                 
3 The derivations are in appendix I.    11
state  in  their  original  country.  As  the  number  of  migrants  from  the  same  household 
increases, the amount of remittances sent by migrantidecreases. Also, as the likelihood 
of a good state increases it is more likely for an altruistic migrant to decrease remittances 
sent home. This is consistent with the belief that remittances are often thought to be 
intended  to  mitigate  the  burden  of  poor  economic  performance  on  the  receiving 
household.  
These two hypotheses follow from the altruistic migrant’s utility function where 
the consumption of the receiving household directly enters the migrant utility. For self-
interest  motivated  remitters  the  utility  of  the  receiving  household  does  not  enter  the 
migrant’s utility function as explained in more detail in the next subsection.  
3.2. Self-Interest 
In the following I consider the opposite case of pure altruism. For a pure self-interest 
migrant the receiving household’s welfare does not enter the utility function and this is 
given by 0 = δ . Therefore the utility function of a self-interest motivated remitter is: 
2 1 log log i i i C C U β α + =                                                 (9) 
This migrant maximizes utility subject to:  
         i i i r Y C − = 1 1                                             (10) 
and           
      ( ) i i i r g Y C + = 2 2                                                         (11) 
where for each dollar remitted migrants receive a return on their investment  ( ) 1 g  where 
( ) 0
' > i r g  and  ( ) 0
' ' > i r g . Migrant i again chooses  i r  to maximize the following utility:   12
( ) ( ) ( ) i i i i i r g Y r Y U + + − = 2 1 log log β α                     (12) 
subject to constraints (9) and (10). The FOC is the following: 
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 which suggests that the number of other migrants in the receiving household and 
the likelihood of a good state have no effect on the amount remitted by a self-interest 
motivated migrant. These findings follow from the self-interest migrant utility function 
which does not account for the welfare of any member of the receiving household. 
Both  cases  of  remittance  behavior  discussed  above  give  distinct  theoretical 
predictions that can be empirically tested. In the next section I describe the data and the 
estimation method.  
4. Data and Estimation Method  
 
4.1. Data 
The data set is a national living standards measurement survey (LSMS) administrated in 
2001  in  Nicaragua.  The  LSMS  was  established  by  the  World  Bank.  This  nationally 
representative survey includes data on several aspects of the household and includes 
4191 families in 4001 households
4. The survey comprises a remittances module where a 
knowledgeable member of the receiving household in Nicaragua was asked about other 
household  members  living  abroad.    The  remittances  module  includes  a  total  of  897 
                                                 
4 In some cases more than one family live in one household. For the migrants sample the number of 
families is the same as the number of households.    13
migrants who belong to 505 families residing in Nicaragua. I have information on the 
migrants’ destination, labor force status, age, gender, education, and years of migration. 
I also have information on the receiving household. I know the number of migrants who 
belong to the same household, the labor force status, gender, age and education of the 
head of the receiving household, as well as the residence of the receiving household.  
4.2. Estimation Method 
In order to investigate the migrant’s remitting behavior I need to determine the signs of 
two  relationships:  remittances  i r   and  the  number  of  other  migrants  k   and  also 
remittances  i r  and the likelihood of a good stateπ  or a bad state π − 1 .  
The dependent variable  i r  is never negative. The level of remittances is zero for a 
large number of observations which means that the data on remittances are truncated 
since remittances are unobserved for the migrants that do not participate in the remitting 
process. In a censored regression model, equation (6) determines both the probability of 
remitting  and  the  level  of  remittances.  I  consider  a  remittance  equation  which  has 
remittances  by  Nicaraguan  migrants  as  a  function  of  individual  and  household 
characteristics: 
i i i u Z X r + + + = 2 1 0 β β β             (14) 
 
where i X includes  migrants’  individual  characteristics,  Z   refers  to  the  household 
characteristics and  ( )
2 , 0 ~ σ N ui .  The migrants and households characteristics enter the 
remittances implicit function in equation (6) through the migrants’ and the receiving 
households’ income levels. In the Nicaraguan survey data, I do not observe migrants’   14
income.  However  I  know  the  migrants’  characteristics  (age,  gender,  education, 
destination, years living abroad and labor force status) and I use those as a proxy for 
income. In equation (6) the migrant’s first period income  1 i Y  is therefore a function of 
migrants’ characteristics given  i X  by ( ) X Yi . For the receiving household I do observe 
the income but for endogeneity reasons I follow the same approach and use the receiving 
heads of households’ characteristics Z  to proxy for their income level.  
Ordinary least squares (OLS) give biased estimates because of the nature of the 
dependent variable. The Tobit model uses the same set of covariates to model both the 
decision  to  remit  and  the  amount  of  remittances.  However  the  coefficients  on  the 
likelihood  of  remitting  and  the  amount  remitted  from  a  Tobit  have  the  same  sign. 
Following Wooldridge (2003), comparing the results of a standard probit to the Tobit 
can be an assessment of the suitability of the Tobit model.  For comparison reasons I 
show the results of a standard Probit and compare the signs of the statistically significant 
coefficients with the signs of the significant coefficients from the Tobit equation.  
The Nicaraguan survey data identifies migrants who are remitters but does not 
identify  the  exact  amount  remitted  by  those  migrants.  I  know  the  total  supply  of 
remittances received by a particular receiving household, the number of migrants living 
abroad and which of these migrants are remitters and which are not. It seems that this 
type of data problem is not uncommon. In fact the same problem exists in the Guyanese 
data  explored  by  Agarwal  and  Horowitz  (2002).  To  overcome  this  data  limitation  I 
proceed with two different approaches. The first approach is to define what I will refer to 
hereafter as the average model. I re-write equation (14) as follows:   15
ij j ij ij u Z X r + + + = 2 1 0 β β β             (15) 
where  i refers to a specific migrant belonging to the receiving household  j . I 
take  the  average  of  equation  (15)  by  summing  over  remitters  in  household  j   and 
dividing by the number of remitters  j s . This leads to the following equation: 
      ∑ ∑ ∑
= = =
+ + + = =
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β β β                   (16) 
where  j R  is the total supply of remittances to household  j . If the number of remitting 
migrants  j s  is either zero or one then the model follows equation (15). Otherwise the 
model is defined by equation (16). Note that the coefficients in equations (14), (15) and 
(16) are the same which insures the same interpretation of the results. Note that since 
ij u ~  ) , 0 (
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j N σ .  Therefore,  equation  (16)  defines  a  heteroskedastic  Tobit  with  a 
known form of heteroskdeasticity. In fact: 
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Equation (17) can be rewritten as: 
                               
2 2
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σ ρ σ = − + = ∑
=
                                     (18)   16
where  s is a migrant other than migrant i in household  j ,  ( )
2 ) ; cov( σ = = ij ij ij u Var u u , 
j sj ij u u σ = ) ; cov(   and  ρ = =





sj ij u std u std
u u
u u corr .  The  variance  of  the  new 
error term is a function of the variance of the original model in equation (8), the number 
of remitting migrants within the receiving household and the correlation of the error 
terms  of  different  remitting  migrants  who  belong  to  the  same  receiving  household
5. 
Finally I estimate the average model using maximum likelihood estimation
6. 
The  second  approach  is  to  limit  the  sample  to  those  migrants  belonging  to 
households with at most one remitting migrant. For each of those migrants I can exactly 
identify the amount remitted. I count 387 households in that category which constitutes 
around 78% of the 494 receiving households. The new migrant sample is 555 which 
represent around 62% of the original 897 migrants. However, there is some concern 
regarding selectivity bias. Households with at most one remitting migrant probably share 
unobserved characteristics that make them form a non random sample. The selection 
issue  comes  into  play  in  forming  the  limited  sample:  households  with  at  most  one 
remitting migrant. In order to overcome this issue I follow Heckman (1979). The next 
section  discusses  the  selection  bias  problem  in  more  details.  In  addition,  section  5 




                                                 







ρ is necessary when  2 ≥ j s  to guarantee a positive variance. 
6 More details on the likelihood function of the average model are presented in appendix II.   17
5. Results 
 
To explore the remittance behavior of Nicaraguan migrants I need to investigate the 
relationship between  i r  andk , and between  i r  andπ . However before going into the 
results I examine the data in more detail. Table 2 examines the characteristics of the 
receiving households by number of other migrants. Table 2 searches for any possible 
relationship  between  the  number  of  other  migrants  and  receiving  household 
characteristics that might play a role in the sign of the coefficient on k . There is no clear 
pattern that can be inferred from Table 2. The percentage of head of household working 
seems to be decreasing with the number of other migrants but with 3 other migrants in 
the household this number picks up again and then with more than 4 other migrants it 
decreases again. Note that the larger the number of other migrants is, the smaller is the 
sample  of  households. The  other  household  characteristics  do  not  show  any  specific 
pattern.  
  In order to capture the probability of a good state versus the probability of a bad 
state I define two different measures. The first proxy is a dummy variable that is one if 
the head of the receiving household left the last job for a particular set of reasons. In 
total, fifteen different answers are listed. The question in the Nicaragua survey is not 
very clear about when the head of the receiving household left their last job. Table 3 lists 
the reasons and the distribution of households by reason.  The list does not follow any 
particular order and the reasons are listed as they appear in the survey. The reasons that 
the  heads  of  household  mention  include  liquidation  of  the  enterprise,  being  fired, 
retirement plans, end of contract, seasonal work, lack of work, personal duties, school   18
duties, lack of safety at work, harassment in the work place and illness. I presume that 
leaving for all of the reasons in Table 3 except for the following reasons: retirement 
plan, end of contract and studies (reasons numbered 3, 5 and 12 in Table 3) is a measure 
of bad outcome. I exclude these latter reasons from the construction of the bad outcome 
measure because they define reasons that could have been expected and therefore the 
receiving household could have acted upon ahead of time.  
  A second measure of the likelihood of a bad state is the length of time that the 
head of household has been without work. Out of 494 heads of household 128 have been 
looking for a job for at least one day. From Table 4, 101 heads of household out of 128 
have been looking for a job for at least one year. I construct a dummy variable for those 
households that have been looking for a job for more than one year. I chose the longest 
search time (the other choices are days, weeks and months) since a long period of time 
better tests the remitting behavior of migrants. It also signals a worse financial situation 
for the households relative to the other search periods. 
  Note  that  both  proxies  define  two  different  income  levels  for  the  receiving 
household. If the head of the household is unemployed or has been looking for a job for 
more than a year, then, in either case, the total income level of the receiving household 
must be different from the total household income in the opposite situation.   
  Table 5 presents the characteristics of households by measure of bad state and the 
characteristics of those households not affected by a bad state shock. For both measures 
the  majorities  of  households  are  located  in  urban  areas  and  have  a  female  head  of 
household.  The mean age of the head of the household is around 60 years old. Those   19
households not affected reside in relatively more rural areas than those affected and also 
have a majority of male head of households.   
  Table 6 shows the characteristics of the pool of migrants who originated from 
non-affected head of households, from head of households who left their job for one of 
the 15 reasons in Table 3 and those head of households who have been looking for a job 
for at least one year. Table 6 investigates any differences in migrants’ characteristics that 
determine migrants’ income i Y . The only striking difference is the gender composition of 
the migrants’ population. More than 50% of the migrant population from unaffected 
households is male whereas more than 50% of migrants from affected households are 
females.  
From the theoretical model in section 3 the characteristics of the head of the 
receiving  household  and  of  the  migrants  determine  their  respective  income  levels. 
Equation  (14)  includes  migrants  and  household  characteristics.  Migrant’s  individual 
characteristics play a major role in the remitting decision. I control for age, level of 
schooling,  gender,  destination,  years  since  migration  and  employment  status  of  the 
migrant. These characteristics affect the migrant’s ability to remit. Moreover, I control 
for the head of the household education level, age, gender, the receiving household area 
of  residence  and  the  number  of  household  nonmigrating  members.  The  main  two 
covariates in the theoretical model, the number of other migrants and the measure of bad 
state are also considered household characteristics.  
Before going into the results I investigate the selection bias problem in more 
details.  Table  7  compares  the  households  and  migrants’  characteristics  across  two   20
different  samples:  the  limited  sample,  which  includes  migrants  who  belong  to 
households  with  at  most  one  remitting  migrant,  and  the  total  migrant  sample.  All 
characteristics between these two samples seem to match suggesting that the limited 
sample is a reliable representation of the total migrant population. The only significant 
discrepancy is the percentage of migrants living in developed countries. For the limited 
sample, the percentage of migrant living in developed countries is 25% while for the 
total  sample  it  is  around  31%.  However,  since  unobservable  factors  can  affect  the 
membership to the limited sample I investigate what variables can help determine the 
association with this sample.  
Table 8 compares the relationship of the migrant to the head of the receiving 
household for three samples: limited sample, the remaining migrants not belonging to 
the limited sample and total migrant sample. The first column in Table 8 is notably 
different from both columns 2 and 3. It seems that migrants forming the limited sample 
are more likely to be spouses and parents to the head of the receiving household than the 
migrants belonging to the other two samples. The migrants forming the limited sample 
are less likely to be the child of the head of the receiving household relative to the other 
two  migrant  samples.  I  proceed  with  spouse  and  parent  as  the  variables  defining 
membership to the limited sample to correct for selection bias. I do that partly because of 
the differences of the percentages in Table 8 and partly because I expect that in the case 
of being the spouse or the parent of the head of the receiving household chances are that 
there would be at most one remitting migrant. I also include in the selection equation the 
labor  status,  education  level,  age,  gender,  destination,  years  since  migration  of  the   21
migrant and the residence location, education level, age and gender of the head of the 
receiving household because these characteristics have an effect the ability to remit
7.  
Table 9 presents the results of a standard Probit on equation (14). As mentioned 
in section 4, I can exactly identify the remitters from the non-remitters and this fact will 
identify  the  dependent  variable  in  the  Probit  equation.  I  compare  the  signs  of  the 
statistically significant coefficients in the Probit equation to the signs of the coefficients 
in  the  main  results  presented  in  Tables  10a  and  10b.  All  the  statistically  significant 
coefficients from the Probit equation and from tables 10a and 10b have the same signs. I 
turn now to the main results.  
Table 10a presents the results of two proxies of good state following the average 
model explained in section 4. Table 10b limits the sample to those receiving households 
with at most one remitting migrant. In Tables 10a and 10b column (1) refers to a dummy 
variable  for  households  where  the  head  had  lost  the  last  job  for  one  of  the  reasons 
discussed above and column (2) refers to a dummy variable for those head of households 
who have been looking for a job for at least one year. I control for the budget constraint 
of  the  migrant  by  including  age,  gender,  level  of  education,  labor  force  status  and 
destination of migrants which implicitly determine migrants’ income. I also control for 
household characteristics as the level of education, the age and gender of the head of the 
receiving household and the location of the household.  
In the average model the variables of interest for this paper have the sign of the 
altruistic migrant model. However the coefficient on  k  is also significant at the 1% 
                                                 
7 The results of the selection equation (first stage Probit) are in Table A in appendix III.    22
significance level. Nicaraguan migrants decrease the amount remitted with the increase 
of migration in the original household that they belong to. The coefficients on  π − 1  
match  the  theoretical  predictions  of  the  altruistic  model  but  are  not  statistically 
significant under both proxies. Having a job, being a female and living in a developed 
country increase remittances. Being older than 30 seems to positively affect the remitting 
decision. The location of the residence of the receiving household also matters.  
Table  10b  presents  the  results  of  a  sample  selection  corrected  estimation  on 
equation (14) limiting the sample to migrants belonging to receiving households with at 
most one remitting migrant. Similar results to the average model are found in this sample 
of 555 migrants. The signs on  k   and  π − 1  match the theoretical predictions of the 
altruistic migrant. Again, only the coefficient on  k  is statistically significant. The other 
covariates also follow the same pattern as the variables in the average model except now 
the gender of the head of the household significantly affects remittances.  
To summarize, there is some empirical evidence that points to some extent to the 
theoretical predictions of the altruistic migrant model developed in section 3. Controlling 
for the migrants’ budget constraint and some head of household characteristics, migrants 
remit less when the number of other migrants increase and they also remit more in case 
of negative income shock in the receiving household. However, Nicaraguan migrants 
seem to react more to the number of migrants in their original household in Nicaragua. 
In both approaches the coefficient on  k  is negative and significant. The coefficient on 
π − 1   is  positive  in  all  these  cases  but  again  not  statistically  significant.  
The labor status, destination and gender of the migrant affect the remitting decision and   23
seem to be robust across all three approaches. The receiving household income level also 
seems to affect the remitting decision since the household income level is determined by 
the education of the head of the household, the gender of the head of the household and 
the location of the residence. All these characteristics affect the remitting decision.  
Note that the average model computes the correlation coefficient between the 
error terms of the remitting migrants belonging to the same receiving households. The 
correlation coefficient  ρ  is positive, statistically significant and close to 0.63 in value. 
This positive value suggests that the remitting decision of migrants belonging to the 
same receiving household is positively correlated. Also, from table 10b I calculate the 
sample selection parameter  λ to be around -0.48 and statistically significant suggesting 
that a sample selection bias does exist in building the limited sample.  
For policy purposes, Table 11 separates the Tobit coefficients of both variables 
of interests from the average approach into two effects: a change in the probability of a 
remitting  and  a  percentage  change  in  the  amount  remitted.  One  additional  migrant 
decreases the probability of remittances by no more than 13%. Migrants are 6% more 
likely to remit in case of a bad state shock. For the amount percentage changes, migrants 
remit  28%  less  with  one  additional  migrant  and  they  remit  between  13%  more  in 
response to a bad income shock.  
This  finding  raises  questions  concerning  the  consequences  of  the  trade-off 
between migration and per migrant remittances in developing countries. One additional 
migrant  leaving  the  labor  exporting  country  decreases  per  migrant  remittances  by  a 
number close to 13%. This negative relationship might have unanticipated effects on the   24
overall impact of migration and remittance on the original country. For instance, the 
finding in Adams and Page (2005) that an increase in both international migration and 
remittances decrease poverty in developing countries might not hold anymore.  
One interesting finding across both approaches is the robustness of the migrant 
gender variable. In all equations (including the Probit equations) female migrants seem 
to remit more than male migrants. In the Nicaraguan sample female migrants constitute 
more  than  47%  of  the  total  migrants’  population.  This  gender  neutrality  makes  the 
remitting  behavior  across  gender  an  interesting  topic.  Following  Vanwey  (2004)  I 
further investigate the gender heterogeneity in the migrant behavior. Table 12 repeats the 
same estimation approaches while limiting the sample to male and then female migrants. 
In all cases the coefficient on the number of other migrants k  is negative and significant. 
However the coefficient on the bad state measure  π − 1  is only positive and significant 
for  female  migrants.  The  results  seem  to  point  out  that  male  migrant  do  not  really 
respond  to  an  income  shock  at  the  receiving  household.  However,  female  migrants 
respond to the same income shock and their response falls under the altruistic model 
predictions. Table 12 suggests that female migrants have a different remitting behavior.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper presents a theoretical model of migrants' remitting behavior. I consider two 
main motivations towards remitting: altruism and self-interest. This paper contributes to 
the  remittances  literature  by  investigating  the  reaction  of  remittances  to  a  bad  state 
outcome on the receiving household rather than on the migrant. The remittance literature 
has focused on studying the remittance behavior in regards to a bad outcome shock to   25
the migrant which leads to an ex-ante risk-sharing behavior. In this paper migrants do 
not  expect  monetary  transfers  from  the  original  households.  This  assumption  is 
consistent with the data evidence from poor developing countries.  
In the theoretical predictions of the model a pure altruistic migrant receives direct 
satisfaction from the welfare of the original household. The total supply of remittances 
enters the receiving household consumption function and therefore the migrant’s utility 
function.  On  the  contrary  pure  self-interest  motivated  migrants  do  not  receive 
satisfaction  from  the  welfare  of  the  receiving  household.  The  theoretical  predictions 
suggest that the number of other migrants who belong to the same receiving household 
has a negative effect on remittances in the case of altruistically motivated migrants and 
no effect at all on the self-interest driven migrants. Also the probability of a good state in 
the receiving country which affects the level of income in the receiving household has a 
negative effect on remittances for an altruistic migrant and again no effect for a self-
interest motivated migrant.  
I test the findings of the theoretical model with data from Nicaragua. I use a 2001 
LSMS data and define two proxies for the bad state outcome and find some empirical 
evidence  supporting  altruism  as  a  main  motivation  behind  remittances  in  Nicaragua.  
The results here are in accord with Agarwal and Horowitz (2002). The number of other 
migrants belonging to the same household seems to play a crucial role in determining the 
remittance behavior.  I also test the gender heterogeneity of the remitting behavior and 
find supporting evidence that female migrants seem to behave more altruistically than 
their male counterparts.    26
Remittances can be motivated by pure altruism without any economic aspirations 
but they can also be self motivated in terms of an implicit contract between the original 
household and the migrant which includes for example inheritance plans. In the former 
case migrants belonging to the same original household together insure that the original 
household is not in financial need and therefore an increase in the number of migrants is 
expected  to  decrease  remittances  per  migrant.  In  the  latter  case  there  is  no  clear 
connection between the number of migrants and remittances since migrants act by self-
interest. From policy perspective and in the case of altruistically motivated remittance, to 
maximize remittances per migrant, labor exporting countries can work on incentives for 
keeping potential migrants from joining other household members. Therefore sending 
countries’  governments  can  affect  remittances  per  migrant  by  targeting  potential 
migrants. These governments need to be aware of the existing trade-off between the 
number  of  migrants  belonging  to  the  same  receiving  household  and  remittances  per 
migrant.  One  potential  policy  interest  is  to  find  the  optimal  k   that  maximizes 
remittances per migrant.  
Finally, researchers such as Hoddinott (1994) model remittances and migration 
as  a  family  decision.  From  that  point  of  view  there  is  some  concern  regarding  the 
endogeneity of the number of other migrants. This concern raises questions pertaining to 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Receiving Households and Migrants by Remitting 
Process 
                        Households 























                       
Receiving Households                                                 
Percent Residing in Urban 
Areas  73.3  71.8  81.2  100.0 
Percentage Head of 
Household Male  58.3  49.1  60.0  66.6 
Percent Head of Household 
Working  75.0  57.6  86.6  100.0 
Mean Age Head of 
Household  51.6  54.5  50.6  48.5 
Mean Years of Education 
of Head of Household  3.2  2.8  2.8  3.3 
         
Sample  180  309  16  6 
         
Migrants         
Mean Migrant Age  28.0  30.3  29.5  33.1 
Mean Migrant Education  6.9  4.5  4.5  4.8 
Mean Years of Migration  5.7  6.7  7.4  9.0 
Percent Residing in 
Developed Countries  20.0  36.3  48.6  66.6 
Percent Working  62.3  78.5  75.6  94.4 
Percent Male  54.2  52.8  51.3  50.0 
         
Sample  260  600  37  18 
Note: 1- All the households in this table have at least one migrant living abroad. 2- Developed Countries 
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Table 2. Characteristics of Receiving Households by Number of Other Migrants k  
 
 



















Household  Sample 
0  75.3  68.3  49.6  52.7  2.9  300 
1  64.7  62.8  58.1  52.4  2.7  105 
2  63.4  56.1  58.5  57.8  2.4  41 
3  90.9  59.0  59.0  56.8  2.9  22 
4 or more  69.2  46.1  50.0  54.9  2.2  26 
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Table 3. Distribution of Households by Reason of Head of the Household Leaving 
the Last Job 
Reasons  Percentage  Count 
1- The enterprise was liquidated  1.8  9 
2- You were dismissed  0.6  3 
3- Retirement Plan  0.2  1 
4- By age  3.6  18 
5- End of the contract  1.6  8 
6- Agricultural cycle/seasonal work ended  0.2  1 
7- You are pensioned off  2.4  12 
8- You earned not much money  2.0  10 
9- You did not like your job  0.6  3 
10- Not much work  0.0  0 
11- Family/home duties  4.6  23 
12- Studies  0.0  0 
13- Insufficient industrial safety  0.4  2 
14- Improper treatment or psychological 
pressures  6.6  33 
15- Illness  1.0  5 
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Table 4. Distribution of Households by Length of Job Search 
Time Spent looking for a Job    Percentage  Count 
     
Days  0.7  1 
Weeks  0.7  1 
Months  19.5  25 
Years  78.9  101 
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Table  5.  Characteristics  of  Receiving  Households  by  Measures  of  Bad  State  versus  Unaffected 
Households 
 









Mean Age Head 
of Household 
Mean Years of 
Education Head 
of Household 
Left Last Job 
(Sample: 128)  82.8  38.2  60.1  2.6 
         
More than 1 Year looking 
for a Job 
(Sample: 101) 
84.1  31.6  61.8  2.5 
         
Not Affected 
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More than 1 
Year looking 
for a Job 
Male  56.3  44.58  44.1 
Working  74.6  73.9  76.9 
Residing in a Developed Country  30.9  33.7  35.3 
Mean Age  28.9  30.1  31.3 
Mean Education  3.6  3.9  3.9 
Sample  623  249  195 
Note: 1- Male, Working and Residing in a Developed Country are percentages. 2- Developed Country 
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Table 7. Characteristics of Receiving Households and Migrants for Households 
with at most One Remitting Migrant (Limited Sample) versus Full Migrant Sample 
                         
Households with at Most 
One Remitting Migrant 
 
Full Migrant Sample 
 
Receiving Households     
Percent Residing in Urban 
Areas  0.74  0.72 
Percentage Head of 
Household Male  0.51  0.52 
Percent Head of Household 
Working  0.67  0.64 
Mean Age Head of 
Household  52.8  53.4 
Mean Years of Education 
of Head of Household  2.8  2.6 
     
Sample  387  494 
     
Migrants     
Mean Migrant Age  28.5  29.3 
Mean Migrant Education  3.4  3.7 
Mean Years of Migration  5.7  6.0 
Percent Residing in 
Developed Countries  0.25  0.31 
Percent Working  0.70  0.74 
Percent Male  0.52  0.53 
     
Sample  555  872 
Note: 1- All the households in this table have at least one migrant living abroad. 2- Developed Countries 
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Table 8. Relationship of the Migrant to the Head of the Receiving Household for 
Households with at most One Remitting Migrant, Full Migrant Sample and the 
Remaining Sample 
                       
Limited Sample  Not in Limited 
Sample  Full Sample                         
Relationship of the Migrant 
to the Head of the 
Receiving Household 
     
Percentage if Spouse  5.9  2.5  4.7 
Percentage if Parent  3.4  1.8  2.8 
Percentage if Child  55.6  65.2  59.1 
                             
Sample  555  317  872 
Note: 1- All the households in this table have at least one migrant living abroad. 2- Developed Countries 
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Table 9. Probit Estimates for Equation (14): All Migrants 
                                    Amount Remitted 
Variables                        (1)        (2) 
Intercept  -0.5137**        -0.4993** 
  (0.2199)        (0.2188) 
Number of other Migrants = k   -0.0443*        -0.0434* 
  (0.0248)        (0.0247) 
Bad State Measure =  π − 1   0.1726        0.1041 
  (0.1120)        (0.1194) 
1 if Working  1.0687***        1.0648*** 
  (0.1149)        (0.1151) 
1 if Education less than 4 Years  -0.206**        -0.2062** 
  (0.1022)        (0.1020) 
1 if Male  -0.1807*        -0.1834* 
  (0.0953)        (0.0954) 
1 if Age greater than 29  0.2805***        0.2805*** 
  (0.1085)        (0.0954) 
1 if Destination is Developed Country  0.4598***        0.4572*** 
  (0.1160)        (0.1157) 
1 if Years since Migration greater than 5  -0.0456        -0.0469 
  (0.1108)        (0.1106) 
1 if Urban Residence  -0.2863**        -0.2806** 
  (0.1123)        (0.1122) 
1 if Education of HHH less than 4  -0.3084**        -0.3011** 
  (0.1216)        (0.1212) 
1 if HHH Male  -0.0221        -0.03164 
  (0.0957)        (0.0954) 
1 if HHH age is greater than 64  0.0696        0.0910 
  (0.1060)        (0.1067) 
Number of Nonmigrants  0.0436**        0.0434** 
  (0.0172)        (0.0171) 
Log Likelihood  -506.38        -507.17 
Sample   872        872 
Note: 1- Columns refer to three different measures for the good state probability: column (1) refers to a 
dummy variable for households where the head had lost the last job for one of the reasons discussed in 
table 3. Column (2) refers to a dummy variable for those head of households who have been looking for a 
job for at least one year. 2- HHH refers to head of the receiving household. 3-*** means significant at the 
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Table 10a:  Tobit Estimates for Equation (14) following the Average Model: All 
Migrants  
                                    Amount Remitted 
Variables                        (1)        (2) 
Intercept  -0.9169*        -0.8821 
  (0.5610)        (0.5586) 
Number of other Migrants = k   -0.8700***        -0.8713*** 
  (0.1071)        (0.1078) 
Bad State Measure =  π − 1   0.3896        0.3695 
  (0.2887)        (0.3143) 
1 if Working  2.5565***        2.5498*** 
  (0.3339)        (0.3344) 
1 if Education less than 4 Years  -0.2452        -0.2519 
  (0.2706)        (0.2699) 
1 if Male  -0.8370***        -0.8404*** 
  (0.2448)        (0.2497) 
1 if Age greater than 29  0.8398***        0.8379*** 
  (0.2778)        (0.2780) 
1 if Destination is Developed Country  1.1550***        1.1574*** 
  (0.2871)        (0.2876) 
1 if Years since Migration greater than 5  -0.1876        -0.1898 
  (0.2703)        (0.2702) 
1 if Urban Residence  -0.4500*        -0.4528* 
  (0.2801)        (0.2806) 
1 if Education of HHH less than 4  -0.2080        -0.1915 
  (0.2687)        (0.2673) 
1 if HHH Male  -0.3634        -0.3650 
  (0.2376)        (0.2399) 
1 if HHH age is greater than 64  -0.1087        -0.1030 
  (0.2939)        (0.2960) 
Number of Nonmigrants  0.0508        0.0482 
  (0.0407)        (0.0407) 
           
Log Likelihood  -641.29        -641.49 
Theta = θ   0.3899***        0.3898*** 
  (0.0151)        (0.0151) 
Rho = ρ   0.6398***        0.6373*** 
  (0.2109)        (0.2116) 
Sample   708        708 
Note: 1- Columns refer to three different measures for the good state probability: column (1) refers to a 
dummy variable for households where the head had lost the last job for one of the reasons discussed in 
table 3. Column (2) refers to a dummy variable for those head of households who have been looking for a 
job for at least one year. 2-*** means significant at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; * at the 
10 percent level. 3- Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   39
 
Table 10b: Sample Selection Estimates for Equation (14): Households with at Most 
One Remitting Migrant 
                                    Amount Remitted 
Variables                        (1)        (2) 
Intercept  1.1499***        1.1617*** 
  (0.3101)        (0.3109) 
Number of other Migrants = k   -0.2568***        -0.2540*** 
  (0.0378)        (0.0388) 
Bad State Measure =  π − 1   0.2153        0.1435 
  (0.1721)        (0.1912) 
1 if Working  0.7901***        0.7926*** 
  (0.1419)        (0.1415) 
1 if Education less than 4 Years  -0.1472        -0.1446 
  (0.1484)        (0.1485) 
1 if Male  -0.2828**        -0.2866** 
  (0.1241)        (-0.1246) 
1 if Age greater than 29  0.3843**        0.3808** 
  (0.1533)        (0.1537) 
1 if Destination is Developed Country  0.6309***        0.6273*** 
  (0.1849)        (0.1858) 
1 if Years since Migration greater than 5  -0.0510        -0.0522 
  (0.1522)        (0.1526) 
1 if Urban Residence  -0.0918        -0.0776 
  (0.1617)        (0.1605) 
1 if Education of HHH less than 4  -0.1198        -0.1009 
  (0.1866)        (0.1868) 
1 if HHH Male  -0.2720**        -0.2898** 
  (0.1345)        (0.1347) 
1 if HHH age is greater than 64  0.1323        0.1458 
  (0.1784)        (0.1861) 
Number of Nonmigrants  0.0173        0.0154 
  (0.0244)        (0.0243) 
           
Log Likelihood  -1516.47        -1517.04 
Sigma = σ   1.4529        1.4544 
           
Lambda = λ   -0.4866***        -0.4871*** 
Sample   555        555 
Note: 1- Columns refer to three different measures for the good state probability: column (1) refers to a 
dummy variable for households where the head had lost the last job for one of the reasons discussed in 
table 3. Column (2) refers to a dummy variable for those head of households who have been looking for a 
job for at least one year. 2-*** means significant at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; * at the 
10 percent level. 3- Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   40
 
Table 11. Summary of The Change in Amount of Remittances and Change in Probability of 
Remitting Results for columns (1) in Table 10a  
                   
Percentage Change in Probability  Percentage Change in Amount                     
Variables     
Number of other 
Migrants = k   -13.39  -28.95 
Bad State Measure = 
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Table 12.  Estimates for Equation (14) with Different Specifications: Male versus Female 
                Average Model  Limited Sample 
  Male  Female  Male  Female 
         
Number of other 
Migrants = k  
    -1.8871*** 
(0.3846) 
   -1.1680*** 
(0.2200) 
   -0.2868*** 
(0.0462) 
   -0.2178*** 
(0.0589) 
         
Bad State 
Measure =  π − 1  
0.2501 
(0.3844) 






         
Likelihood  -376.39  -363.94  -787.17  -713.53 
Sample  400  370  290  265 
Note: 1- The bad state measure is the first proxy used under column (1) in Tables 10. The same results are found using the 
second measure of the bad state but they are not reported here. 2-*** means significant at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 
percent level; * at the 10 percent level. 3- Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 4- All the equations in this table include 
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Appendix I: 
 
Derivations of equations (6) and (7): 
 














































































where  0 f L H Y Y − .  













i r  in equation (5): 








−i i L H i i kr r Y Y r Y π π
δ α
 which leads to 
    ( ) i i i i L H r Y kr r Y Y δ δ α α π α απ − = + + − + − 1 1  
and therefore I can write ( ) ( ) i L H i i kr Y Y Y r − − − − − = + α π α απ δ δ α 1 1  
and then after rearranging some terms I get to the following: 
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= −    43
The utility function is strictly quasi-concave which insures the uniqueness of the solution 
*
i r .  
Appendix II: 
 





ij j L L
1
ln for the average model is the following where  j s  is 
the number of remitting migrants in household  j : 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] θ β γ * 1 ln 1 ln ln
' ' X X Lij Φ − = Φ − =                if  0 = j s              (12)     
 
   
( ) ( ) [ ]
2 ' 2 ln * 5 . 0 ln γ θ θ X R L ij ij − − =                        if  1 = j s              (13) 
 






























h h h h
L ij
j j j j
ij      if  1 > j s              (14)    







; = = . 
The likelihood function for the third case ( 1 > j s ) is derived from the likelihood function 
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Appendix III: 
Table A:  First Stage Probit Estimates for the Sample Selection Estimates on 
Equation (14) in Table 10b  
                                    Amount Remitted 
Variables                                 





























1 if Parent 
 
1 if Spouse 
 
1 if Working 
 
1 if Education less than 4 Years 
 
1 if Male 
 
1 if Age greater than 29 
 
1 if Destination is Developed Country 
 
1 if Years since Migration greater than 5 
 
1 if Urban Residence 
 
1 if Education of HHH less than 4 
 
1 if HHH Male 
 




Note: 1- Columns refer to three different measures for the good state probability: column (1) refers to a 
dummy variable for households where the head had lost the last job for one of the reasons discussed in 
table 3. Column (2) refers to a dummy variable for those head of households who have been looking for a 
job for at least one year. 2-*** means significant at the 1 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; * at the 
10 percent level. 3- Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 